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Inadvertent Implications of the
War Powers Resolution
Michael A. Newton *
The constitutional infirmity of the War Powers Resolution
has been uniformly demonstrated by more than four decades of
bipartisan experience. The Resolution manifestly fails to
eliminate the healthy inter-branch tensions that are in our
constitutional DNA with respect to military deployments. In its
context, the override of President Nixon’s veto represented little
more than a stark act of congressional opportunism. The
President’s veto message was prescient in warning that the
Resolution is “dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.”
This article suggests that the act represents an attempted
abdication of the enumerated obligation of Congress to oversee
military operations via the appropriations power. It describes
reasons why our republic would be well served by clear-eyed
reassessment of the War Powers Resolution. It spawned three
serious defects: 1) it displaced good faith dialogue between the
co-equal branches with after the fact litigation, 2) it highlights
American political will as the weakest strand of otherwise
formidable military capacity, and 3) it creates a perverse
inventive to reverse engineer military operations based on
statutory language in ways that undermine strategic objectives.
American lives and interests are ill-served by these inadvertent
implications.
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I. Introduction
The constitutional infirmity of the War Powers Resolution 1 (the
Resolution) as a statutory straitjacket on executive authority has
been uniformly demonstrated by more than forty years of practice.
The Resolution has nonetheless exacerbated three profoundly
dangerous trends in the context of modern military operations. Since
its adoption on November 7, 1973, there are few people who have
criticized that legislation with more insight or persistence than my
distinguished co-panelist Bob Turner, who has reiterated today his
verdict that the legislation was a fraud. 2 I prefer to view the
legislative effort to circumscribe the Commander-in-Chief’s
constitutionally mandated authority as a feckless effort at modern
constitutional revisionism. Indeed, the inadequacy of the Resolution
for the purpose sought by its proponents was evident almost from the
outset. Congressional arguments that the executive power operates
under the bonds of legislative handcuffs are accordingly misplaced.
Successive executive branch declarations, most recently President
Obama’s defense of the use of American power over Libya to aid
those rebel forces seeking to overcome the tyranny of Muammar
Qaddafi, make the Resolution itself something of an archaic
expression of an earlier era of American politics. Implicitly conceding
their own inability to overthrow the constitutional order, a series of
bipartisan congressional actions have implicitly reinforced the
impotence of the Resolution with startling clarity.

II. Judicial Avoidance of War Powers Issues
The Article III courts have uniformly elected to remain aloof from
the legislative-executive struggle. Though this is a subject rich with
irony and legal nuance, the interests of time permit me to describe
only three such instances, the legal issues surrounding 1) the NATO

1.

H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548).

2.

Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an
Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud That Contributed
Directly to the 9/11 Attacks, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 109 (2012); see
also ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1991).
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campaign in Kosovo; 2) US military engagement in Kuwait; and 3)
the policy of targeted bombing under President Clinton.
The NATO air campaign against the forces of Slobodan Milošević
began on March 24, 1999 without any formalized expression of
congressional support and prior to the subsequent action of the UN
Security Council. As a matter of international law, the Kosovo
campaign was hotly contested given that it proceeded without either
Security Council authority or a basis derived from a clear and
imminent need for national self-defense. 3 Following the campaign, the
Security Council rejected a Russian effort to condemn the campaign
as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 4 Furthermore, the
Council implicitly endorsed the intervention by passing Resolution
1244 under its Chapter VII powers without expressly commending or
condemning NATO’s actions. 5 On the domestic front, there were
several votes in Congress during the air campaign and the coordinated
ground actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army 6 that fell short of
either authorizing an actual deployment of forces or a making a

3.

See Bruno Simma, NATO: the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (1999) (finding even the mere threat of armed
intervention to violate the prohibition on the threat or use of force);
Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria ius Oritur: Are we Moving Towards
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures
in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 29 (1999) (agreeing
with Professor Simma’s view that the NATO action was contrary to the
core principles of the UN Charter).

4.

See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989
(Mar. 26, 1999) (recording the vote to reject Russia’s draft resolution to
condemn NATO’s actions by a vote of twelve to three).

5.

See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244, (June 10, 1999). Professor
Thomas Franck analogized this to the refusal to condemn India’s
violation of Article 2(4) during the intervention in Bangladesh. See
Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 857, 859
(1999).

6.

In the interests of full disclosure, the author acknowledges that he was
in the service of the US government working under the authority of
Ambassador David Scheffer in the Office of War Crimes Issues,
Department of State at the time of the Kosovo campaign. In that
capacity, he helped to prepare the early estimates of missing Kosovar
Albanian men and document the ongoing atrocities committed by
Serbian military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo; he coordinated and
deployed with the FBI into Kosovo to collect the evidence that
supported the crimes against humanity charges against Milosevic in the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See DAVID
SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS 251–95 (2012) (discussing the Kosovo
conflict in 1998 and 1999 and the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia’s role in prosecuting those responsible for war
crimes during the conflict).
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formal declaration of war. 7 The House of Representatives rejected
such a declaration of war as between United States and Yugoslavia by
a vote of 2-427. 8 During the bombing, Representative Tom Campbell
(R-CA) along with twenty-five members sought a judicial declaration
that the actions of the executive violated the Constitution and the
War Powers Act. 9 The District Court for the District of Columbia
decided that the legislative branch plaintiffs lacked standing due to
the absence of an actual “constitutional impasse” or attendant “actual
confrontation” for the bench to resolve. 10
Similarly, in the widely cited case Dellums v. Bush, fifty-four
members of Congress challenged the authority of President George
H.W. Bush to order offensive operations to repel the Iraqi aggression
into Kuwait based on the authority of the Chapter VII Resolution
alone. 11 The case was dismissed as not ripe for judicial determination,
though Judge Harold H. Greene wrote in dicta that some of the most
sweeping Justice Department arguments would effectively neuter the
constitutional authority to “declare war” by turning it into a “merely
semantic decision” dependent upon the discretion and drafting skill of
the commander-in-chief and his advisors. 12 In language that seems
strikingly prescient of the Obama Administration’s justifications for
the use of American air power over Libya during 2011, Judge Greene
opined that “such an ‘interpretation’ would evade the plain language
of the Constitution, and it cannot stand.” 13 The War Powers
Resolution and the broader array of congressional-executive
interactions related to armed hostilities thus remain authoritative
only as a matter of domestic decision making. The political dynamic
over the resort to American military power operates irrespective of
the larger scope of articulable authority derived from international
legal principles.
Apart from the series of standing and ripeness determinations,
courts have commonly avoided constitutional collisions between the
co-equal branches of the federal power by invoking the political
7.

See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 12 (2005).

AND

8.

See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30352, WAR
POWERS LITIGATION INITIATED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SINCE THE
ENACTMENT OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 8 (2012).

9.

See id.

10.

Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F.Supp.2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 203 F.2d
19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

11.

LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 171 (2d ed. 2004); Dellums
v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1143, 1143 n.1 (D.D.C. 1990).

12.

752 F.Supp. at 1145.

13.

Id.
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question doctrine. In one of the most pointed invocations of the
Commander-in-Chief power, President Clinton authorized the
bombing of targets in Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan in response to
terrorist actions against U.S. interests. 14 The Court of Appeals in the
DC Circuit reiterated in an en banc decision rendered in June 2010,
that “[u]nder the political question doctrine, the foreign target of a
military strike cannot challenge in court the wisdom of retaliatory
military action taken by the United States.” 15

III. History the War Powers Resolution and the
Debate Over Executive Authority
The history of heated political and legal debates between
congressional and executive officials has been well summarized in the
literature, and time does not permit undue regurgitation today. The
tenor of the political debates and the constitutional passion with
which they were framed should not in itself be surprising. This
extensive history itself leads to judicial abstention, despite the
repeated efforts of congressional leaders to force the federal courts to
align themselves with legislative branch equities. In the words of the
El-Shifa majority:
By asserting the authority to decide questions the Constitution
reserves to Congress and the Executive, some would expand
judicial power at the expense of the democratically elected
branches. And by stretching beyond all precedent the limited
category of claims so frivolous as not to involve a federal
question, all would permit courts to decide the merits of
disputes under the guise of a jurisdictional holding while
sidestepping obstacles that are truly jurisdictional. 16

The War Powers Resolution fails in the first instance on that level
alone, as it seeks to eliminate the healthy inter-branch tensions and
debates that should guide the use of American power. The “Purpose
and Policy” section states that:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-inChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
14.

Michele L. Malvesti, Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.,
Winter-Spring 2002, at 18–19.

15.

El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (en banc).

16.

Id. at 850–51.
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clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
armed forces. 17

Section 4(a) further requires the president to submit a report,
within forty-eight hours of introducing U.S. Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and to the president pro tempore of the Senate.18
The report must provide the circumstances necessitating the
introduction of such forces, the constitutional and legislative authority
under which such introduction took place, and the estimated scope
and duration of the hostilities or involvement. 19 Section 5(b) requires
the president, within sixty calendar days of submitting such report, to
terminate any use of the U.S. Armed Forces unless Congress takes
certain enumerated actions to authorize continuing combat or “is
physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the
United States.” 20 The sixty-day period, however, may be extended to
ninety days if the president certifies to Congress that “unavoidable
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces
requires the continued use of such armed forces in bringing about a
prompt removal of such forces.” 21 “Thus, when a report under section
4(a)(1) is filed . . . section 5(b)’s 60 day (or, when appropriate, 90
day) ‘clock’ begins to run.” 22
Perhaps the gravest obligation of the chief executive is that of
keeping the nation safe from its enemies. The burden of watching
American families sacrifice themselves pursuant to the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief means that decisions to employ American
military power can never be lightly undertaken. There must in turn
be a tight nexus between the force employed and the principles that
guide that use of force and the larger strategic imperatives. The
essence of America is embodied in her sons and daughters, and the
profound decisions to use force affect the life of the nation as well as
17.

Pub. L. No. 93-148, §2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1541(c)) (emphasis added).

18.

Id. § 4(a)(1)–(3) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(3)).

19.

Id. § 4(a)(3).

20.

Id. § 5(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)).

21.

Id.

22.

Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to the Att’y Gen., Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in
Kosovo (Dec. 19, 2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/final.h
tm.
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the lives and safety of those young Americans. This is the essence of
what it means to have created a constitutional republic in which the
authority of the executive derives from the consent of the governed.
Conflicting cross-currents of debate between the president and
Congress over the use of force national identity are in our very
national DNA. All American wars have had an inevitable political
linkage. Heated disagreements over the proper scope and use of
American military accordingly date to our earliest national
experiences. 23
The original impulse of the War Powers Resolution might have
been admirable, though there is ample evidence that it actually
represented an act of stark congressional opportunism. Prior to the
override of President Nixon’s veto on November 7, 1973, the 93rd
Congress had failed in eight previous veto override attempts. 24 Quite
apart from the ultimately mortal wound to the Nixon presidency
occasioned by Watergate, the War Powers Resolution came in the
context of a tumultuous period of American political life. The massed
armies of Arab states, led by Syria, attacked Israel on October 6th,
and the Yom Kippur War ended on October 25th, the day after
President Nixon’s veto of the War Powers Resolution. 25 Vice
President Spiro T. Agnew had resigned on October 10th, after being
charged with having accepted more than $100,000 in bribes while
serving in a succession of public offices. 26 The Arab oil embargo began
on October 19th, and the economic attrition was just beginning to
bite the nation. 27 The incident we now remember as the “Saturday
Night Massacre” took place on October 20th, as President Nixon fired
Archibald Cox, the Justice Department special prosecutor for
Watergate, and abolished the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which

23.

See generally Alexander Hamilton & James Madison, The PacificusHelvidius Debate, GAZETTE OF THE U.S., June 29, 1793, available at
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?documentprint=4
29.

24.

See Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution:
Time to Say Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 4 (1998).

25.

See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4021 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2013).

26.

See Letter from House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford to President
Richard M. Nixon, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/educat
ion/lessons/ford-nixon-letter/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).

27.

See James C. McMillin, Principled Fairness in the Regulation of
Petroleum Prices, 57 TEX. L. REV. 573, 577 (1979) (discussing the 1973
Arab oil embargo).
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in turn prompted the resignation of the Attorney General, Elliott
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus. 28
The pressure for presidential impeachment was palpably building.
The veto of the War Powers Resolution just four days after the
Saturday Night Massacre presented a tempting target against a
weakened president. At the same time, the papers were full of
accounts that President Nixon had total income of nearly $800,000 for
tax years 1970, 1971, and 1972 but had paid only some $5,000 in
combined federal taxes. 29 The tax revelations would ultimately
prompt perhaps the most memorable public statement of Nixon’s long
career as he held a press conference on November 17, 1973 to
proclaim: “Well, I’m not a crook. I’ve earned everything I’ve got.”30
Public opinion polls of the time showed that 76% of those asked had a
negative impression of President Nixon’s ability to “inspire confidence
personally in the White House.” 31 Some 83% of the American people
rated the President negatively for his “handling of the Watergate
case” according to the Harris Survey. 32 Is it any wonder that a
number of legislators reversed their votes on the War Powers
Resolution to override President Nixon’s veto? What other issue in
American political life has since managed to unite more than 80% of
the vox populi? Would anyone have expected the 93rd Congress to
align itself with the executive interests of an increasingly unpopular
administration, in the midst of the oil shock and an increasingly
fearful public?
Setting aside the unique political confluence that produced the
congressional override of President Nixon’s veto, the focus of this
essay is my firm conviction that the larger interests of our republic
would be well served by a clear-eyed reassessment of the actual
implementation and effects of the War Powers Resolution. The phrase
“repeal and replace” is a commonly voiced sentiment in our political
discourse, albeit in a wholly distinct context from the war powers
debate. President Nixon’s veto message from October 24, 1973
28.

See Rex VanMiddlesworth, Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation, 61
TEX. B.J. 84, 84 (1998); Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Faces Firing of Cox;
Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/
articles/102173-2.htm.

29.

See A Portrait of a Country Awash in ‘Red Ink,’ NPR (July 30, 2012),
http://m.npr.org/story/157449392.

30.

See Richard Nixon, “I’m Not a Crook,” YOUTUBE (July 15, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sh163n1lJ4M.

31.

Nixon Tumbles to New Low in Confidence Poll, NASHUA TELEGRAPH,
Mar. 17, 1971, at 18.

32.

See The Watergate Files, GERALD R. FORD LIBR. & MUSEUM,
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/museum/exhibits/watergate_files/c
ontent.php?section=3&page=d (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
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categorically declared that the act infringed executive authority in
ways that would be “both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best
interests of our Nation.” 33 Experience bears out his prediction in ways
that were unforeseen at the time. After nearly forty years, real
reevaluation would be appropriate given the context of modern
conflicts and in light of technological innovation. On a perhaps more
poignant level, the War Powers Resolution has had profoundly
dangerous effects on the conduct of American military operations.
American lives and interests are ill-served by its inadvertent
implications.
Before focusing on three distinct dimensions of these dangerous
trends, we should frame our reassessment of the War Powers
Resolution against a couple of bedrock truths. In the first place, no
one should cavalierly disregard the context of the American
constitutional ferment at the time of the framers and the subsequent
ratification debates. We’ve grown so accustomed to the trappings of
our federal republic that we forget that there was vigorous debate in
the Constitutional Convention whether the executive power should be
vested in either a singular or plural executive. These lengthy debates
originated from a visceral rejection of a monarchical power, which was
the defining imperative that shaped American perceptions at the time.
The shift towards rejection of the person and power of the King of
33.

Veto of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 25. Nixon’s veto
message began:
While I am in accord with the desire of the Congress to assert
its proper role in the conduct of our foreign affairs, the
restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the
authority of the President are both unconstitutional and
dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.
The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the
conduct of foreign affairs have been debated since the founding
of our country. Only recently, however, has there been a serious
challenge to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in choosing not
to draw a precise and detailed line of demarcation between the
foreign policy powers of the two branches.
The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of foreseeing
every contingency that might arise in this complex area. They
acknowledged the need for flexibility in responding to changing
circumstances. They recognized that foreign policy decisions
must be made through close cooperation between the two
branches and not through rigidly codified procedures.
These principles remain as valid today as they were when our
Constitution was written. Yet House Joint Resolution 542 would
violate those principles by defining the President’s powers in
ways which would strictly limit his constitutional authority.
Id.

181

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution

England marked the decisive turning point of the American struggle
for independence. 34 George Washington recognized that focusing the
energy of the army on the king as the enemy who must be overcome
in order to achieve the cause of American independence was
profoundly cathartic to the military effort. In order to sustain morale
and a sense of mission, he ordered that the pamphlet Common Sense
by Thomas Paine be distributed to the troops. 35
Against the backdrop of continental rejection of the monarchy as
a governing institution, Benjamin Franklin, among others, voiced
concerns that a singular executive could readily arrogate power as
against the legislative branch and become overambitious or, in his
words, “fond of war.” 36 The disagreement over the identity of the
chief executive was amplified by the reality that any federal standing
army would be under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.
Delegates rejected efforts to give Congress a role in the conduct of
hostilities. Article I accordingly gives Congress the authority only to
“declare war” as delegates unanimously rejected a role for
congressional authority to “make war.” 37 This must have relieved
General Washington greatly as he knew better than anyone the
grievous effects of congressional management of the Revolution. 38 The
debate over a singular Commander-in-Chief would have been
particularly uncomfortable to General Washington who reportedly sat
with composure and stoic character throughout the discussion. 39 In
the draft of Washington’s first inaugural address, there is some
evidence that he remained troubled by the presumed aspersions upon
the character of the chief executive. In his draft text (which was
amended prior to the actual public speech), he wrote that:
34.

See SCOTT LIELL, 46 PAGES THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE,
TURNING POINT TO AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 16–21 (2003).

35.

Id. at 125.

36.

CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 60

AND THE

(1986).

37.

See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.

38.

See CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE
CONTINENTAL ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER 1775–1783, at 64–65
(1979) (stating that Congress repeatedly refused Washington’s and other
generals’ requests to increase enlistment service for militia men or to
provide bounty incentive to increase the length of service, and to move
from a militia to a Continental army).

39.

See Richard J. Behn, The Dignity of Leadership from Washington to
Lincoln, THE LEHRMAN INSTIT., http://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/thedignity-of-leadership-from-washington-to-lincoln.asp (last visited Feb.
16, 2013) (“Washington’s stoic and modest dignity was essential to the
trust that the Second Continental Congress placed in him in 1775 when
they selected him to command the Continental Army.”).
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[I]f there should be a single citizen of the United States, to
whom the tenour of my life is so little known, that he could
imagine me capable of being so smitten with the allurements of
sensual gratification, the frivolities of ceremony or the baubles
of ambition, as to be induced from such motives to accept a
public appointment: I shall only lament his imperfect
acquaintance with my heart, and leave him until another
retirement (should Heaven spare my life for a little space) shall
work a conviction. 40

The second conceptual underpinning of the War Powers
Resolution was the deep-seated colonial reluctance to envision a
sweeping executive branch authority paired with a permanent
standing army. Writing as “Centinel” in the Philadelphia Freeman’s
Journal of October 24, 1787, Samuel Bryan opined that:
A standing army with regular provision of pay and
contingencies, would afford a strong temptation to some
ambitious man to step up into the throne, and to seize absolute
power. The keeping on foot a hired military force in time of
peace ought not to be gone into unless two thirds of the
members of the legislature agree. 41

In a similar cautionary vein, other anti-federalists wrote in the
New York Journal that “keeping up a standing army, would be the
highest degree dangerous to the liberty and happiness of the
community . . . no government should be empowered to do that
which if done, would tend to destroy public liberty.” 42 The framers
addressed these vehement objections by giving an express and
delimited power to the legislative branch. Article 1, section 8 of the
Constitution expressly provides congressional authority to “raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be
for a longer Term than two Years.” 43 No less an authority than
Alexander Hamilton later argued that this limitation provided “a
precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great
and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident
40.

George Washington, Fragments of a Draft of the First Inaugural
Address, in WRITINGS 705 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997).

41.

“Centinel” II, To Avoid the Usual Fate of Nations: Reply to Wilson’s
Speech, FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES,
AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE FOR RATIFICATION, PART ONE 85
(1993) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION].

42.

“Brutus” VIII, On the Calamity of a National Debt that Cannot Be
Repaid, and On Standing Armies, N.Y. J., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 41, at 736.

43.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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necessity.” 44 In Hamilton’s opinion, seemingly ubiquitous among the
Federalist camp, vesting the exclusive power of raising and supporting
military forces in the popularly elected legislative branch would be the
surest check upon the power of an otherwise overweening chief
executive bent on committing the republic to military adventures.
Thus, in the words of a leading Federalist writer during the debates
over ratification the “representatives of the people have it in their
power to disband th[e] army every two years, by refusing supplies.” 45
The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has
argued that the War Powers Resolution was enacted against a
background that was “replete with instances of presidential uses of
military force abroad in the absence of prior congressional approval.” 46
It further distinguished the types of conflicts the act was intended for,
reasoning that Congress’ overriding interest was to prevent the
United States from being engaged, without express congressional
authorization, in “major, prolonged conflicts such as the wars in
Vietnam and Korea, rather than to prohibit the President from using
or threatening to use troops to achieve important diplomatic
objectives where the risk of sustained military conflict was
negligible.” 47 In Crockett v. Reagan, Judge Joyce Hens Green
concluded “the automatic cutoff after 60 days was intended to place
the burden on the President to seek positive approval from the
Congress, rather than to require the Congress positively to disapprove
the action, which had proven so politically difficult during the
Vietnam war.” 48 These arguments are misplaced in the sense that the
very raison d’etre of the congressional appropriations power, with
respect to the armed forces, was to “frustrate presidential warmaking
that was not in the nation’s interests.” 49
The very constitutional infirmity of the War Powers Resolution is
thus embedded into its structure because it purported to shift the
burden from congressional exercise of express constitutional powers to
achieve the very purpose envisioned when the framers crafted the
appropriations power. Such an abdication of wholly appropriate
44.

“Publius,” The Danger of a Standing Army: “An Intention to Mislead
the People,” INDEP. J., Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted in DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 41, at 576.

45.

Rebuttal to “An Officer of the Late Continental Army”: “Plain Truth,”
INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 41, at 109.

46.

Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory
Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980).

47.

Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C.
173, 175 (1994).

48.

Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982)).

49.

YOO, supra note 7, at 160.
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legislative oversight of operations cannot be remedied by the
statutory device designed to shift responsibility onto the Commanderin-Chief absent an affirmative act by Congress. The inconsistency
between the design of Article 8 and the text of the War Powers
Resolution is perhaps the primary driver for the uniform disregard of
its mandates by both the executive and legislative branches. In other
words, the War Powers Resolution, since the very day of its
enactment, has demonstrated the invalidity of congressional
arguments that the executive power operates under the bonds of
statutory handcuffs.

IV. Ramifications of the War Powers Resolution
There are, nevertheless, at least three inadvertent ramifications of
the War Powers Resolution that have become apparent after forty
years of practice. The irony is that while the framers clearly
envisioned a legislative role in the employment of American military
power, the very effectiveness of American power has been undermined
by the War Powers Resolution through which the 93rd Congress
purportedly attempted to enshrine just such congressional oversight
and inter-branch consultation. The three most consequential
inadvertent implications of the Resolution are discussed below.
A. President as Litigator-in-Chief

First, debates over the applicability of the War Powers Resolution
have shifted the attention from the proper role of the president as the
national leader to that of the national litigator-in-chief. The
interpretation guidance to the War Powers Resolution states that the
Resolution should not be “construed as granting any authority to the
President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” 50 But this
assumes that the president already has such authority, and that the
Resolution is not “intended to alter the constitutional authority of the
. . . President.” 51 Additionally, although the text makes plain that,
even in the absence of specific authorization from Congress, the
President may introduce armed forces into hostilities only in “a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces,” every lucid observer
concedes that this declaration, found in the Purpose and Policy
section, either is incomplete or is not meant to be binding. 52 The War
50.

50 U.S.C. § 1547(d)(2) (2012).

51.

Id. § 1547(d)(1); Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti,
18 Op. O.L.C. at 176.

52.

Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C.,
at 176 (quoting Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the
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Powers Resolution effectively marginalized the congressional role to
carping from the sidelines as various presidents have launched an
increasingly diverse range of military operations.
After forty-years practice, there is a long line of precedent that
has stretched the bounds of executive power in ways that could
scarcely have been imagined by the framers. For example, the OLC
opinion for the use of force in Somalia in 1992 reasoned that,
“Attorneys General and this Office have concluded that the President
has the power to commit United States troops abroad as well as to
take military action, for the purpose of protecting important national
interests,” even without specific prior authorization from Congress.53
Just two years later, the OLC echoed its’ reasoning in the deployment
of armed forces into Haiti. 54 The “pattern of executive conduct, made
under claim of right, extended over many decades and engaged in by
Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences the existence of broad
constitutional power.’” 55 The independent authority of the executive
derives from the president’s unique responsibility, as Commander-inChief and chief executive for foreign and military affairs as well as
national security. 56 The OLC used similar reasoning once again in
1995 in relation to the proposed deployment into Bosnia. 57 It
explained that the scope and limits of the congressional power to
declare war is not well defined by constitutional text, case law, or
statute, but rather, the relationship of Congress’ power to declare war
and the president’s authority as Commander-in-Chief and chief
executive has been clarified by two-hundred years of practice. 58

President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 81
(1984)).
53.

Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op.
O.L.C. 6, 6 (1992).

54.

Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. at
178.

55.

Id. (quoting Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad
Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. at 187).

56.

See Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op.
O.L.C., at 176 n.4 (citing Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 266
(1909) and The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 421, 427–28
(1814)); see also id. at 178 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 789 (1950)).

57.

Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19
Op. O.L.C. 327, 333 (1995).

58.

See id. at 330−31; see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 70–71 (1990) (noting how historical precedent serves as “quasiconstitutional custom” in foreign affairs).
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This frame of reasoning is uniformly supported by the judiciary,
including the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in
Dames & Moore v. Regan:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . .
may be treated as a gloss on “Executive Power” vested in the
President by §1 of Article II. Past practice does not, by itself,
create power, but long-continued practice, known to and
acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the
[action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent[.] 59

In Haig v. Agee, Chief Justice Burger further reasoned that the
historical practice reflects the two political branches’ practical
understanding, developed since the founding of the republic, of their
respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national defense.60
Jack Goldsmith, who admirably delivered the keynote address earlier
this morning, described this reasoning as simply a principle of
constitutional law—”that a constitutional meaning may be liquidated
by constitutional practice.” 61 Professor Goldsmith argued that
Congress had known about the pattern of presidential unilateralism
for decades and done little in response. Congress has never seriously
questioned the use of overseas military power without its
authorization, much less impeached a president for authorizing such
force. Instead, a succession of bipartisan legislatures has financed an
enormous military force in the face of this continuing practice and has
consistently refused to withhold funding for a wide array of
deployments. The net effect of this practice has been to immunize the
president from oversight. Hence, presidents of both parties are in an
almost unassailably strong litigation posture vis-á-vis Congress, and
they know it.
The War Powers Resolution has therefore had the paradoxical
effect of displacing good faith debate and dialogue between the
branches with after-the-fact litigation. Presidents of both parties have
felt confident that courts would support their executive prerogatives,
and the War Powers Resolution has had the unfortunate effect of
creating the perception that the constitutional authority is subject to
distributive bargaining between the executive and legislative
branches. Thus, presidents have relied upon their inherent
59.

Dames v. Moore, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

60.

Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291–92 (1981).

61.

Jack Goldsmith, War Power, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/03/war
_power.html.
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constitutional authority, secure in the belief that the war-making
function is not a zero sum game. In the process, there has been a
tendency to rely upon successful litigation strategies rather than a
clearly presented framing of the national objectives at stake in a given
deployment or a clear-eyed national discussion of the merits of such
overseas action.
B. US Enemies’ Ability to Manipulate American Political Will

The corollary to this modern reality, and the second of three
inadvertent implications of the Resolution, is that our enemies now
focus on American political will as the Achilles heel of our vast
capabilities. Prior to the War Powers Resolution, President
Eisenhower understood that it was necessary to “seek the cooperation
of the Congress. Only with that can we give the reassurance needed
to deter aggression.” 62 President Clinton understood the importance of
clear communication with the Congress and the American people in
order to sustain the political legitimacy that is a vital element of
modern military operations. Justifying his bombing of targets in
Sudan, he argued that the “risks from inaction, to America and the
world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our
enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us
intact.” 63 In his letter to Congress “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” the president reported that the strikes “were a necessary
and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist
attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities” and “were intended to
prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified terrorist
threat.” 64 The following day, in a radio address to the nation, the
president explained his decision to take military action, stating, “Our
goals were to disrupt bin Laden’s terrorist network and destroy
elements of its infrastructure in Afghanistan and Sudan. And our goal
was to destroy, in Sudan, the factory with which bin Laden’s network
is associated, which was producing an ingredient essential for nerve

62.

See Louis Fisher, Presidential Power in National Security: A Guide to
the President-Elect, in WHITE HOUSE TRANSITION PROJECT REPORTS 11
(2007). See also FISHER, supra note 11, at 124–25 (noting that
Eisenhower understood the independence of executive and the
interdependence as a pragmatic matter for funding and political
expediency, yet still sent troops to Lebanon and began US involvement
in Vietnam).

63.

President William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action
Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, in II PUB. PAPERS
1460, 1461 (1998).

64.

President William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting
on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, in
II PUB. PAPERS 1464, 1464 (1998).
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gas.” 65 Citing “compelling evidence that the bin Laden network was
poised to strike at us again” and was seeking to acquire chemical
weapons, the president declared that we simply could not ignore the
threat posed, and hence ordered the strikes. 66 Similarly, President
Clinton understood that intervention in Bosnia could not be
successful absent some national consensus, which had been slow to
form during the long Bosnian civil war. 67
Secretary of State George Schultz provided perhaps the most
poignant and pointed example of this truism in his testimony to
Congress regarding the deployment of US Marines into Lebanon to
separate the warring factions in 1982. On September 21, 1983, he
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and provided
a chilling premonition of the bombing that would come only one
month later and kill 241 Americans, which was the bloodiest day in
the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima. 68 Seeking to bolster
legislative support and to better explain the strategic objectives, he
explained that:
It is not the mission of our marines or of the [Multinational
Force in Lebanon] as a whole to maintain the military balance
in Lebanon by themselves. Nevertheless, their presence remains
one crucial pillar of the structure of stability. They are an
important deterrent, a symbol of the international backing
behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and an
important weight in the scales.
To remove the marines would put both the Government and
what we are trying to achieve in jeopardy. This is why our
domestic controversy over the war powers has been so
disturbing. Uncertainty about the American commitment can
only weaken our effectiveness. Doubts about our staying power
can only cause political aggressors to discount our presence or to
intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure.

65.

President William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address, in II PUB.
PAPERS 1464, 1465 (1998).

66.

Id.

67.

See Bob Dole, Balkans Require Bipartisanship, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13,
2001, at A10 (noting that although “a strong bipartisan consensus on
Bosnia policy existed in Congress for most of the first half and much of
the second half of the Clinton administration,” the inaction of the first
half of Clinton’s administration cost the Bosnian population dearly).
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See Pres. Ronald Reagan, Proclamation 5396˗A Time of Remembrance,
1985, in II Pub. Papers 1283, 1283 (1985).
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An accommodation between the President and Congress to
resolve this dispute will help dispel those doubts about our
staying power and strengthen our political hand. 69

Following the spectacularly successful terrorist attack on the
Marine barracks in Beirut, President Reagan withdrew the Marines.
Osama bin Laden later cited this as an example of American weakness
that could not withstand the jihadist fury he sought. 70
The legal battles over the scope and effect of the War Powers
Resolution have highlighted the focus on national political will as the
fulcrum of successful military operations by requiring assurances that
military operations are limited in nature, duration, and scope, and
therefore well within the president’s constitutional authority as
Commander-in-Chief and chief executive. President Obama’s report to
Congress in the context of the Libya operations in 2011 cited
precedent from air strikes in Bosnia that took just over two weeks
and involved more than 2,300 US sorties and the deployment of US
forces in Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1993. 71 The White House
released a memorandum from the OLC, similar to previous
interventions, explaining how the authorization to use such force was
constitutional on the basis that “‘war’ within the meaning of the
[Constitution’s] Declaration of War Clause” does not encompass all
military engagements, but only those that are “prolonged and
substantial . . . typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel
to significant risk over a substantial period.” 72 President Obama
consistently maintained that the US role in Libya was limited,
unlikely to expose any US persons to attack (especially given the role
of missiles and drones and the utter inability of Qaddafi’s forces to
strike back with conventional means), and likely to end
expeditiously. 73 By that logic, it did not require authorization from
69.

War Powers Resolution: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel.,
98th Cong. 1 (1983) (statement of Hon. George P. Shultz, Sec’y of
State).

70.

See Osama Bin Laden, Bin Laden’s Fatwa, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 23,
1996),jhttp://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/july-dec96/
fatwa_1996.html?print (explaining Bin Laden’s comments about the
Beirut massacre).

71.

Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8–9 (2011).

72.

Id. at 8.

73.

See id. In the Pentagon, the legal opinion of whether we were at war
with Libya for purposes of the War Powers Resolution, and more
specifically, for purposes of the termination clause, certainly did not
seem to be an opinion one was open to give, perhaps knowing it did not
coincide with others in the administration. Then Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates was asked in an ABC News interview on March 27,
whether Libya posed an actual or imminent threat to the United States.
Gates responded quite simply, “no.” He explained that although Libya
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Congress. The administration ultimately adopted a legal analysis that
the US military’s activities fell short of “hostilities,” and thus, the
president needed no permission from Congress to continue the mission
after the expiration of the sixty-day reporting window specified in the
War Powers Resolution. 74 The president’s reasoning rested on
previous OLC opinions that what counts as war depends on “a factspecific assessment of the ‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’ of
the planned military operations.” 75
Present justifications for bypassing the War Powers Resolution
hinge on interpretations that it requires “prolonged and substantial
military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military
personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.” 76 The OLC
engaged in similar reasoning in the Bosnia intervention in 1995,
explaining that in deciding whether the proposed deployment into
Bosnia amounted to a “‘war’ in the constitutional sense, considerable
weight was given to the consensual nature and protective purposes of
the operation.” 77 That deployment was similarly intended to be a
limited mission but that mission, in contrast to the present one, was
in support of an agreement that the warring parties had reached and
it was at the invitation of the parties that led to the belief that little
or no resistance to the deployment would occur. Though some
scholars argued that the Libya OLC Memorandum defended its
reasoning for why the operation did not amount to “war,” it did not
address whether the administration believed that it will have to stop

was a national interest to the United States, it was not a vital one.
Interview by Jake Tapper, ABC News, with Defense Sec’y Robert Gates
and Sec’y of State Hillary Clinton (Mar. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4800.
Similarly, a few months later, as the sixty-day clock neared expiration,
the question of whether we were at war with Libya was increasingly
more important and controversial. Jeh Johnson, the Pentagon General
Counsel similarly told the White House he believed that the United
States military’s activities in the NATO-led air war amounted to
“hostilities.” Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 18, 2011, at A1.
74.

See Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing
U.S. Role in Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A16.

75.

Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. at 8 (quoting
Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C.
173, 179 (1994)).

76.
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operations upon expiration of the sixty-ninety-day clock under the
War Powers Resolution. 78 The deadline passed with little fanfare.
The memorandum also relied upon quite distinguishable precedent
to serve as a guiding point in this intervention. Professor Goldsmith
argued the opinion broke “new ground . . . in its extension of the ‘no
war’ precedents beyond the Bosnia and Haiti situations—which
involved consensual peacekeeping-like introductions of ground troops
but no significant uses of force—to cover two weeks of non-consensual
aerial bombardments.” 79 Thus, even as it incentivizes short term,
limited deployments, the War Powers Resolution embeds an
inevitable constitutional collision between the coordinate branches.
Our enemies can rely upon constitutional carping from Congress, and
in fact can adapt tactics and statements that seek to undermine
political will in the US Congress and among the American people
from the first days of an operation. The Resolution helps to ensure
that such debates over the national political will take center stage
sooner rather than later, and an asymmetric enemy can in theory
erode our political will even before it solidifies.
C. Restrictive Rules of Engagement at the Expense of Achieving
Strategic Objective

Finally, the War Powers Resolution has the pernicious effect of
incentivizing commanders to adopt a form of reverse engineering in
the planning and conduct of operations. The effort to limit casualties
and designed to create minimal risk relies on previous OLC reasoning
that such operations would comply with the statutory mandate. 80 As
noted above, commanders-in-chief must ensure that there is a tight
nexus between the strategic reason for ordering deployments of US
forces and the optimal conduct of hostilities to secure those objectives
quickly and with the least possible expenditure in terms of blood and
treasure.
As Private Eddie DiFranco stood guard in front of the Marine
Barracks that October morning in Beirut in 1983, he was under strict
Rules of Engagement that prohibited him from chambering a live
round in his weapon. 81 The Sergeant of the Guard, Stephen Russell,
78.

See Robert Chesney, A Point-by-Point of Libya’s OLC Memo, LAWFARE
(Apr. 7, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/04/a-pointby-point-summary-of-olcs-libya-memo/.

79.

Jack Goldsmith, Office of Legal Counsel Opinion on Libya Intervention,
LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2011, 1:32 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011
/04/office-of-legal-counsel-opinion-on-libya-intervention.

80.

Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19
Op. O.L.C. at 332.
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remembers the yellow Mercedes truck that sped by on its way to kill
241 Americans. 82 He recalls that the driver smiled at him as he drove
past the guard who was too slow to react. 83 Even as crews cleared the
rubble from the bombing, marines posted a chilling cartoon on a
bulletin board. The cartoon undoubtedly captures the view some
soldiers have of ROE in the era of the War Powers Resolution—it
showed a Marine rifleman in a prone firing position behind a
barricade in Lebanon. 84 The president of the United States is shown
whispering in his ear, “Before you fire, I want you to consider the
nuances of the War Powers Act.” 85
To be sure, the War Powers Resolution coincided with a set of
revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare, the abolition of the
national draft, and the transition to an all-volunteer force, and
epochal changes in the nature of conflict as new non-state actors
became the norm. It is also historically clear that the micromanagement of conflict did predate the War Powers Resolution in
some circumstances. One need only remember President Johnson
helping to select targets in Vietnam for instance. 86 It is difficult to
pinpoint a causal linkage between the Resolution and the dramatically
more restrictive conduct of modern operations. However, the passage
of the War Powers Resolution most definitely injected an entirely
unhealthy degree of politicization into the war-making function.
Though it was intended to reinforce the parallel authorities of the coequal branches of the federal government, it actually embedded great
incentives for commanders to issue restrictive rules of engagement in
an overall effort to limit casualties, as well as the scope of the conflict.
This domestic political restriction created controversy for example
during the Kosovo air campaign between the United States and its
NATO allies. Of more fundamental concern to the war-fighters and
the lawyers that advise them, artificial rules that go well beyond the
normal bounds of the laws and customs of warfare logically lead to
increased American casualties as they erode the morale of the force.
To the extent that the War Powers Resolution helped to inject
political sensitivity into the conduct of operations, it has led to
constrained rules that may not be the optimal pathway for achieving
US strategic objectives. Constrained rules in turn actually make
82.

Rick Hampson, Haunting Memories of the Blast that Shook the World,
USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
military/2008-10-15-beirut-barracks_N.htm.

83.
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missions longer and more costly. This is not at all of course to imply
that there are inherent limits on the commander-in-chief’s war-making
authority, but to the extent that the Resolution embeds artificial
barriers to the accomplishment of US military objectives, it artificially
impedes US success in ways that its drafters would certainly not have
foreseen or sought.

V. Conclusion
The War Powers Resolution is an outdated and demonstrably
irrelevant relic of a bygone era of American political life. Its vestigial
remains nevertheless result in heated debates between the coordinate
branches of the federal government. This is especially true in the
modern era of uncertainty regarding the precise scope of international
authority for the use of force. At the time of this writing, debate
continues over the adoption of the crime of aggression in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Current texts require
that trans-state aggression must be “manifest” in order to warrant
criminal sanction. 87 The function of the threshold is twofold. First, it
implies a magnitude test by referring to the gravity and scale of the
act of aggression. Second, by referring to the character, the threshold
poses a qualitative requirement: the state use of force must be
unambiguously illegal. This qualitative aspect is very important
because there has been extensive debate on whether Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter is dead or useless because of its complete
indeterminacy. 88 The prohibition arising from international law on the
use of force is surrounded by a legal grey area of some significance.
The scope of anticipatory self-defense and forcible rescue operations at
this juncture as well as some forms of humanitarian intervention
remain defensible but unclear under international law. 89
In all those cases, reasonable international lawyers may disagree
about the current state of the law. It would be thoroughly unwise to
87.

Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(1), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

88.
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States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (1970) and Michael J. Glennon, The Fog
of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 540 (2002).
See also Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J.
939 (2005). For Glennon’s unsurprisingly skeptical conclusions
concerning the crime of aggression, see Michael J. Glennon, The BlankProse Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 71 (2009).

89.

For a more comprehensive (and at the same time masterfully succinct)
exposition of this grey area, see Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Aggression, in
ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 322–25 (2d ed. 2010).
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try to clarify this grey area through the back door of the international
criminal justice system, and it is my opinion that the International
Criminal Court should avoid these murky waters. However,
unresolved domestic debates over the War Powers Resolution run the
risk of undermining the US posture in these diplomatic debates even
as they weaken national resolve and undermine the efficiency of our
deployed forces. The War Powers Resolution should be repealed and
replaced with a more modern and flexible formulation that balances
these important needs and helps to ensure a synergy between the
coordinate branches of government and the forces in the field.
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